GfKV newsletter #23 – is Europe facing a breaking point?

Herbert Saurugg, saurugg.net

Yes – but more as a creeping stress test of an already strained system, not as a single “disaster with a date”. It is about a combination of geopolitical conflicts, energy shortages, weather extremes and attacks on critical infrastructure that continues to eat up our reserves – and thus increases our vulnerability to the next shock.

In this newsletter we venture an outlook on the coming winter 2026/27, which holds considerable potential for threats.

A systemic view – not an exact forecast

Importantly, this newsletter is not a weather or price forecast that will come true exactly as described, but a systemic view. We look at patterns, relationships and possible cascade effects, especially the consequences if several unfavourable factors occur at the same time: a cold spell with a “Dunkelflaute” (dark doldrums – little wind and sun), low storage levels, a diesel shortage, sabotage of critical infrastructure and a tense financial and security situation.

Whether there really will be a “breaking point” depends on these overlaps and on our mental, organisational and technical preparation.

Our aim is to address clearly issues that could become dangerous for the common good, even if much is still uncertain. As we have seen in the past, our systems are indeed more robust than expected at the time of analysis. But that should not lead us to expect the same in general for the future. So far things have gone well. We should continue to hope that this will remain so. But hope alone is not a plan for a society fit for the future.

With our assessments we therefore want to help increase society’s capacity to act in good time, so that we are not once again completely surprised by a systemic crisis. Otherwise there is a danger that even more damage is done through knee-jerk actionism or growing social polarisation.

The information in this newsletter reflects the state of knowledge as of 18 September 2026.

Key points for readers in a hurry

Europe faces a winter in which several areas of tension are at work at the same time: geopolitical conflicts, tight gas and diesel supplies, possible weather extremes due to El Niño and increasing attacks on critical infrastructure. It is not about an exact forecast but about understanding how these factors together strain the system – and how preparation helps us avoid falling into fear or powerlessness.

Key points in brief:

• Gas & electricity: gas storage is unusually low; in extreme cold and dark doldrums there are supply risks, because gas and electricity are now closely coupled.
• Diesel & AdBlue: scarce refinery capacity worldwide keeps diesel markets tight – this can hit logistics, agriculture and industry through high prices and bottlenecks.
• El Niño as the weather wild card: an overall milder, windier winter is likely, but with an increased risk of individual cold and storm events that can severely strain the energy system.
• Hybrid attacks: sabotage and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are increasing and aim to destroy trust and polarise societies – often uncertainty alone is enough.
• Systemic view: bottlenecks show up first in prices and distribution, only later as real physical scarcity – what matters is strengthening your own buffers in good time.
• Call to action: do not stare at “the one event”, but build up confidence to act locally and personally: play through “what if …?”, implement simple preparedness measures and strengthen neighbourhood structures.

From the global system break to winter 2026/27

In the last three GfKV newsletters (German) we described the “global system break”: a phase in which several crisis areas – energy, food, industry, finance, conflicts and fiscal policy – come under pressure at the same time and reinforce one another.

Many of the expected upheavals have so far not occurred at all, or only in weakened or delayed form or by indirect routes, because states and companies have fallen back on reserves, diversions and stopgap solutions. Examples include sharply reduced strategic oil reserves, postponed refinery maintenance and rationing in poorer countries.

These buffers have bought time but have not created new stability. If a system survives crises by using up its reserves, it becomes even more fragile in the event of another shock – especially when several strains occur at the same time.

This is exactly the situation we are in now, going into winter 2026/27. We will shortly publish a further update on the 4th global system break.

Sabotage and hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure

Acts of sabotage and hybrid attacks on critical infrastructure have long since become part of the conflict space – not only in Ukraine but also in Europe. They range from attacks on railway and power lines through drone flights over refineries and LNG terminals to cyber attacks on authorities and companies.

The European Parliament explicitly points out that power lines, interconnectors and submarine cables in particular are increasingly being considered as targets for sabotage and must be better protected. At the same time, this highly interconnected infrastructure can hardly be protected. Things can always be improved, but there will never be one hundred per cent security. We should therefore above all ask ourselves how we can better deal with and cope with the possible consequences, instead of continuing to pass the issue on to others.

For every successful disruption creates the desired “noise”: uncertainty, polarisation and loss of trust. Often the fear of the next attack is enough to divide societies. And this is exactly where we should not play along and play into the hands of those who want to challenge and destroy Europe.

Energy under strain: gas, electricity, diesel

Gas: low storage levels, expensive options

In mid-September, German gas storage facilities were around 56 per cent full – the lowest level in 15 years. In southern Germany they were as low as around 43 per cent.

According to scenarios by the gas storage association INES, a level of around 77 per cent would technically be achievable by 1 November if the injection rate picks up significantly. The association considers this level sufficient for normal winter temperatures but warns: in an extremely cold winter, storage could be empty by the end of January, and on particularly cold days shortfalls of over 25 per cent would be possible.

Europe as a whole is somewhat better off, but also has to cope with historically low storage levels and a high need to buy LNG in a short time. Model calculations show that LNG imports would have to rise considerably to bring storage up to the required 80 per cent by early November – with prices rising and in competition with Asia.

It should also be noted that Europe has replaced its previous gas dependence on Russia with a strongly increased dependence on LNG (mainly from the USA, partly also from Russia and Qatar). No really robust alternatives.

Electricity: more renewables, but import dependence

ENTSO-E’s outlook for winter 2025/26 gave Europe an overall favourable supply situation under “normal market conditions”: many countries can now cover their peak demand from their own generation when renewables are feeding in well. At the same time, the report shows that countries such as Germany remain dependent on electricity imports in scenarios with low wind and solar production. In addition, individual regions – such as Ireland, Finland, Estonia and Lithuania – carry increased risks under extreme conditions.

In Great Britain, the system operator NESO explicitly warns of individual hours in which additional measures may become necessary due to dark doldrums.

At the same time, Norway has enshrined in law that electricity exports can be limited when water levels are very low; given the recently low levels in important reservoirs, this increases the risk that less energy will flow to Great Britain, Denmark and Germany in winter.

Diesel and AdBlue: the underestimated bottleneck

The current scarcity concerns not so much crude oil as refinery capacity and finished products, such as the diesel and AdBlue that are essential for logistics.

Europe cannot cover its diesel needs from its own refining capacity alone and imports a significant part of its consumption. After Russian supplies ceased, the gap was closed mainly by refineries in the Gulf and in India. The further escalations in the Middle East and the increasing attacks on critical infrastructure – most recently also on the Saudi East-West pipeline (“Petroline”) leading to the Red Sea, which is important for Europe – are further reducing available resources. Outages at Libyan oil fields are another drop that could make the cup overflow.

Indian refineries are already running at over 100 per cent capacity. American refineries, too, have been running close to full capacity for weeks. In the past, such utilisation rates always led to serious outages. Additional outages, however, could hardly be compensated. At the same time, there is renewed discussion in the USA about limiting diesel exports – the USA is the largest diesel exporter.

So far the shortages have mainly shown up in rising prices. Record levels have already been reached in the USA, which will also increase domestic political tensions. In Pakistan, sharply increased fuel prices are already leading to massive social tensions as well as widespread protests and social unrest.

This is precisely where the systemic danger lies: if logistics, agriculture and industry can only obtain diesel and AdBlue at very high cost, these costs are passed on through the entire value chain. It will be even worse if rationing actually becomes necessary.

Price risk

Significant premiums are already being traded on the futures markets for winter electricity, as low gas and hydro reserves reflect the risk of high prices and tight supply. Further price increases are therefore quite realistic unless a completely surprising geopolitical easing occurs.

In 2024 the European Court of Auditors pointed out that, despite initial reforms, the EU remains vulnerable to renewed price shocks and, in particular, still lacks a viable framework for protecting consumers from unaffordable gas prices.

In our view, the political response of reintroducing general price caps is well meant and understandable for individuals, but it reduces the state’s overall room for manoeuvre to deal with an even more severe crisis. As so often, there is a lack of genuine and honest risk communication about the structural causes.

El Niño as the weather wild card

According to current assessments, El Niño 2026/27 will be one of the strongest events since records began; international climate services consider the probability of a very strong event in autumn/winter to be high. For Europe this means, on average, milder, wetter and windier conditions, especially in autumn and early winter – but with an increased probability of storm events.

At the same time, a strong El Niño can influence the polar vortex and thus favour cold waves: if the polar vortex is weakened or temporarily collapses, Arctic cold air can push far south – including into Europe. Experts therefore stress that El Niño improves the predictability of the winter but does not “deliver” a concrete winter forecast: a mild winter is plausible, but individual extreme cold snaps remain possible.

Foresight instead of oracles

The experience of recent months confirms a simple but uncomfortable insight: vague warnings such as “supplies could become tight, prices could rise” can hardly be checked afterwards, since almost any development can be read into the original statement. Foresight only becomes really helpful when we force ourselves to be specific:

• Which physical bottleneck is decisive (for example refinery capacity rather than the quantity of crude oil)?
• Where does the pressure shift next – price, allocation, substitution, stocks, or only then physical failures?
• In what rough time window do we expect the effects – and what would clearly refute our assessment?

Analyses of sulphur, sulphuric acid and ammonia in the course of the Hormuz crisis show how helpful such an approach can be. The expected shifts along the value chains could be tracked quite well there. At the same time, the “misses” were at least as instructive, as they showed how systems sometimes absorb bottlenecks through high prices rather than real failures, at least as long as there is still a corresponding willingness to pay. The real costs then only reach customers and inflation with a delay. A limit in the system is therefore first a price signal, then a question of distribution – and only when these mechanisms are exhausted does physical scarcity arise.

Calm through preparation – your room for manoeuvre

In the last newsletters (German) we described the attitude “acceptance – letting go – patience – cooperation” as our guiding principle. Seeing the situation soberly without falling into powerlessness or actionism, and consciously creating free space and buffers. This is more important today than ever, as many systemic buffers have already been used up and we should not rely on a “normalisation out of habit”.

For the coming winter this means in concrete terms:

• Recognise patterns instead of chasing headlines: pay attention to the indicators mentioned above and not just to daily news.
• Build up confidence to act: ask yourself “what if …?” – consciously play through what a power or IT outage lasting several days, a diesel shortage or a supply disruption would mean for your everyday life, your organisation or your municipality, and which simple measures are possible now.
• Do not fall into the intended reaction patterns: sabotage and hybrid attacks aim at fear, polarisation and uncertainty. Preparation and calm are the best response.
• Strengthen community: decentralised units capable of acting, with clear emergency plans, are one of the most effective responses to systemic risks.

The decisive question is therefore not whether the big blackout or the one breaking point will come, but how well we, our organisation and our municipality are prepared for various possible disruptions so that we can remain capable of acting even in turbulent times.

This capacity to act is also the central basis for defence capability. It is not to be expected that Russia will actually attack Central Europe militarily. But it is already a lived reality that we as a society are to be divided, and trust in our structures destroyed, through hybrid attacks in the form of sabotage of critical infrastructure and, above all, information operations. Always bear this in mind when you read reports that make your emotions run high, and think twice before sharing such reports. Rather carry out a thorough plausibility check first.

What is particularly perfidious is that weaknesses of politics or administration are deliberately exploited and perfectly justified criticism is instrumentalised. Polarising politics is therefore part of the problem. Unfortunately, hardly any forces can be seen that recognise this danger and try to counter it through dialogue and discourse. As Albert Einstein said, problems cannot be solved with the same logic that created them. It is therefore also up to us to show and take new paths here.

In this spirit, we hope that we can once again contribute to your personal picture of the situation and provide an impetus for the preparedness described. For it is precisely this that is crucial in order to get through a possibly turbulent winter as well as possible and not let ourselves be torn apart!

This article first appeared in German on saurugg.net – with kind permission of Herbert Saurugg. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 4.0, Herbert Saurugg. Translated from German by GAIA.
Cover image: wal_172619 / Pixabay